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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-2086
___________
EDWARD A. BUDA,
Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN, III; DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF WAYNE COUNTY;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellees.
___________
On Appeal from an Order of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 03-cv-00878)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 25, 2008
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES, and Weis, Jr., Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: September 11, 2008 )

OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
On August 11, 1996, Edward Buda, along with two co-defendants, Michael
Wilson and David Mandeville, broke into the home of Charles Gregg with the purpose of
stealing guns and other property. When Gregg entered his house during the burglary,
Buda and one of his co-defendants duct taped Gregg’s hands, feet, and face, and then all
three perpetrators shot Gregg, causing his death. Nearly a year later, Buda was arrested,
pled guilty to first degree murder, and received a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful petition for relief under Pennsylvania’s Post
Conviction Relief Act, Buda filed for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
alleging that his plea counsel, Jeffrey Wander, was ineffective by overemphasizing the
likelihood that Buda would receive the death penalty following a trial. After an
evidentiary hearing before a magistrate judge, the District Court denied the petition,
concluding that Wander’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. We will affirm.1
We provided an extensive review of the facts and procedural history in a previous
opinion. See Buda v. Stickman, 149 Fed.Appx. 86 (3d Cir. 2005) (Buda I) (vacating the
District Court’s denial of Buda’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanding for

1

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We
construe Buda’s timely filed notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of appealability.
See Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2004). We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253.
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an evidentiary hearing). We will not recount them here.

Because this case is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this Court’s scope of review
is extremely deferential to the state court’s findings of fact and determinations of law.
Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 428 (3d Cir. 2007) (“AEDPA requires federal courts
collaterally reviewing state proceedings to afford considerable deference to state courts’
legal and factual determinations on the merits.”). Section 2254(d) limits habeas review
of state court judgments to cases that fall within two exceptions to the general rule of
abstention: cases in which the state court’s proceeding
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In order for a reviewing federal court to find a state court’s
application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” that application must be “more
than incorrect or erroneous”; it must have been “objectively unreasonable.” Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (citation omitted); see also Taylor, 504 F.3d at 428-29.
In this case, the relevant clearly established Supreme Court law is Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny, which articulated the standard for
constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel. Under Strickland, to succeed on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Buda “must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland,
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466 U.S. at 687. To show deficiency, Buda must show that his attorney’s performance
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The Supreme Court
continued:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel’s was unreasonable. . . . [A] court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy.
Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). If an attorney’s actions are the result of
“strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible
options,” the presumption of reasonableness is essentially irrebuttable. Id. at 690.
However, even if an attorney’s strategic choice is made “after less than complete
investigation,” those choices are still considered “reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. . . . In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel’s judgments.” Id. at 690-91.
Buda’s counsel, Wander, believed that there was a high probability that a jury
would impose the death penalty should Buda go to trial. Therefore, in the days leading to
trial, Wander wrote Buda a letter recommending that he accept life imprisonment, rather
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than risk the death penalty following a trial:
Please be advised that I believe I have had the opportunity to make an
ample investigation into the facts, circumstances and charges presentely
facing you . . . . It is my professional opinion that the chances of you
leaving the courtroom after your trial with anything less than a life sentence
are unlikely. . . . Obviously, a conviction on First Degree Murder will allow
the jury to consider whether or not to impose the death penalty. There are
more aggravating factors than mitigating factors and, although the number
of each of these facts is not the deciding factor, you must be aware that the
Commonwealth has more on its side than we have on our side.
Therefore, as I stated to you yesterday, if you are seeking to avoid the death
penalty, which I hope you would, and you know that you can leave the
courtroom with a life sentence, I would suggest that you strongly consider
taking that route. . . . Although you are the one who must do the time, I
would hope that you would consider the feelings of your mother,
grandmother and other individuals who would suffer extreme mental duress
if the death penalty were imposed on you. Although you may have done
things in your life that have caused it not to turn out the way you wish, I
would hope that you would not do anything to other people if you have a
chance to at least let them know you, love you and visit you over the
coming years.
App. 476-77. Buda now contends that this advice was the result of an inadequate
investigation regarding potential defenses and mitigating circumstances that would have
rendered the death penalty unlikely. In particular, Buda contends that because he shot
Gregg after his two co-defendants, a jury could have concluded that Gregg was already
dead when Buda pulled the trigger; because one of Buda’s co-defendants forced Buda to
fire by threatening his life, the defense of duress was available; and because Buda was
voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the crime, he did not have the specific intent to kill
necessary to receive the death penalty.
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The record following the evidentiary hearing shows that Wander did in fact
consider each of these arguments. Regarding the argument that Gregg was dead at the
time of the shooting, Wander argued in an Omnibus motion that Buda could not have
committed first degree murder because the victim was already dead when Buda shot him.
After this motion was denied, Wander decided that this argument was weak, because,
among other things, Buda himself admitted that he was the second person to shoot, not
the third; Buda admitted that he had no basis for knowing whether Gregg was dead or
alive when he fired; and Buda’s co-defendant Michael Wilson was an unreliable witness
because of his varying accounts of the crime.
Next, Wander researched the defense of duress, but concluded that it was
unhelpful because Buda had placed himself in a situation where duress was likely. See 18
Pa. C.S.A. § 309(b) (stating that duress is “unavailable if the actor recklessly placed
himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress”).
Finally, Wander was aware that Buda smoked marijuana with his co-defendants prior to
the burglary and homicide, but did not think Buda was sufficiently intoxicated to rebut
specific intent. Indeed, Buda’s testimony reflects a detailed recollection of the crime
perpetrated.
Wander also considered the community sentiments regarding the Gregg murder
and concluded that a local jury would not hesitate to impose the death penalty. In
addition, Wander considered that a felony-murder conviction would carry a sentence of
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life imprisonment, if not death, which rendered the risk of a jury-imposed death penalty
following conviction unnecessarily high. After Buda’s plea offer of second degree
murder was rejected by the district attorney, who indicated his intent to seek the death
penalty, Wander recommended that Buda enter a guilty plea for first degree murder with
no death penalty. Buda completed a seven-page, written plea colloquy in which he
acknowledged a full understanding of the plea agreement and the rights he was foregoing
by pleading guilty, and indicated that he was exercising his free will in entering the guilty
plea. He also indicated that he was satisfied with the representation he had received from
Wander.
In our view, Buda has failed to show that Wander’s investigation, trial preparation,
and counseling fell below “the wide range of professionally competent assistance” under
the circumstances, or that the investigative demands now being made would have resulted
in any useful information not already known to Wander. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
Therefore, we need not address the prejudice prong of Strickland, and we will affirm the
District Court’s denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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